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Strategic  manipulations  and  collusions  in  Knaster  procedure:  a 
comment
Abstract. Following a recent paper by Fragnelli and Marina (2009) concerned with the 
susceptibility of the Steinhaus-Knaster procedure for discrete fair division problems to 
insincere representations of the agents’ preferences, the present short note shows that 
modified procedures proposed in the literature present a reduced degree of vulnerability 
to strategic manipulations.
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In a recent contribution Fragnelli  and Marina (2009) analyze  the effects  of strategic 
bidding under the sealed bids procedure for discrete fair division problems originally 
proposed by Steinhaus (1946) and Knaster (1946), taking into account the possibility of 
information  exchange  among  the  agents.  As  a  result  of  their  analysis  the  Authors 
conclude  that  the  procedure  “is  a  manipulable  mechanism  ...  each  agent  has  the 
possibility  of  a  declaration  for  an  object  that  increases  his  payoff  w.r.t.  the  true 
valuation ... two agents may improve their payoffs with coordinated false declarations ... 
completely risk averse agents [may obtain] a total  gain that does not depend on the 
declarations of the other agents”.
The purpose of the present short  note is to propose a minor extension of the above 
investigation showing that an appropriate modification of the mechanism of distribution 
of the revenue after the auction ensures not only envy free allocations in case of sincere 
bidding – a property not satisfied by the original method – but also a reduced degree of 
vulnerability to strategic manipulations.
To this end, let us denote by  N  the number of agents and by  qi  the fraction of the set 
of items to be divided that agent  i  is entitled to,  i = 1, 2,..., N ; moreover, assuming, for 
sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, that there is just one (indivisible) item 
to be assigned, let us denote by  bi  the sealed bid of agent  i, where  b1 ≥ b2 ≥ ... ≥ bN 
(possibly after a renumbering of the agents) and recall that in the original procedure as a 
result of the auction step the item is assigned to the highest bidder (at random, if there is 
a tie for the greatest bid) who pays 
)1(11)11(1 mbqbqp −−−=
and each agent  j, j > 1, receives the compensatory cash amount
)1( mbjqjbjqjp −+=  
where   NbNqbqm ++= ...11  .  Under  sincere  bidding  the  resulting  allocation  is 
proportional and efficient but, in general, not envy free.
The class  of  modified  procedures  to  be  considered  (see  Chisholm  2000;  see  also 
Willson 2003, Corradi and Corradi 2005) is based on a k-double auction (see Cramton, 
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Gibbons  and  Klemperer  1987):  the  item  is  assigned  to  the  highest  bidder;  in  the 
subsequent cash transfer distribution the winning bidder pays  p1 = (1 – q1)X, where  X 
is a convex combination of b2 and b1 , X = (1 – k) b1 + kb2, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, and each agent  j, 
j > 1, receives the compensatory cash amount  pj = qj X; in particular,
a1) X = b1  (as in a standard first-bid auction),
a2) X = b2  (as in a Vickrey second-bid auction).
The resulting division is efficient and envy free.
Now let us examine possible effects of insincere bidding.
a1) In this case the payoff of each agent, except the winning bidder, is independent of 
his own bid, so he has no incentive at all to misrepresent his valuation in order to obtain  
any gain. As for the winning bidder, only in case he acquires reliable information about 
the bids of all his opponents he can safely increase his payoff by insincerely submitting 
a bid slightly above the second highest bid, if the highest bid is unique; if there is a tie  
for the greatest bid, e.g.  b1 = b2 > b3 , then agent 1 and agent 2 could collude, agreeing 
to insincerely submit a bid slightly above the second highest bid, say  b3 + ε, with  ε < 
b1 − b3 , and consequently sharing the total gain  
(1 – q1 – q2)(b1 − b3 − ε) . 
(We note, however, that in this scenario each agent could find it in his interest to defect 
from the agreement since by raising his bid slightly above the agreed price he can rule 
out the possibility that the item be assigned to the rival.)
a2) In this case the price that the winning bidder pays is determined by the competitors’ 
bids alone and does not depend on any action the bidder himself can undertake. If any 
agent  j  has reliable information about any other agent  h’s  bid, with  bh > bj, then he 
has some incentive to insincerely bid slightly less than  bh : indeed, if  bh  turns out to 
be the highest bid, then such a manipulation has the effect of maximizing the second 
price and consequently the payoff of all agents except the winning bidder, otherwise it 
has no effect. It may be pointed out that while in general, under the assumption that the 
strategies  of  bidders  are  limited  to  the  submission  of  bids,  each  bidder  has  a  well 
defined best bid (his true valuation) regardless of how he believes his rivals will bid, in 
the present context, in which each agent is simultaneously a seller (pro-quota) and a 
potential  buyer  (via  his  bid)  the  incentives  encouraging  strategic  bidding  do  not 
disappear. 
It is clear that for different values of  X, with  b2 <  X <  b1 , the resulting envy free 
methods mix aspects of both first-price and second-price auctions and, with reference to 
strategic manipulations, they undergo the limitations of both.
Note. According to a suggestion by Chisholm, cit., the auction stage of the envy-free 
methods could be conducted in formats other than a sealed bid auction, e.g. by holding 
an English open outcry auction. Now, different auction formats are known to lead to 
different  results  in  terms  of viability  and profitability  of  collusion,  see Graham and 
Marshall (1987), Marshall and Marx (2007), Marshall and Marx (2008). In any case, in 
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the  present  context  using  the  envy  free  methods  neither  individual  nor  collusive 
manipulations by completely risk averse agents allow of safe gains regardless of the 
other agents’ bids. □
To summarize, we can conclude that, in comparison with the original Steinhaus-Knaster 
procedure, the modified procedures not only yield envy free allocations under sincere 
bidding, but also are less vulnerable to manipulative conducts. In particular, from the 
foregoing  discussion  it  follows  that  in  any  case  no  room  is  left  to  safe  profitable 
collusions among completely risk averse agents: moreover, method  a1 fails to induce 
sincere revelations of the agents’ valuations only in the extreme (somewhat unrealistic) 
case in which the winning bidder has exact knowledge of the bids of all other agents, 
and even in this case only the winner turns out to be tempted to adopt an exploitative 
strategy: as noted by Willson, cit.,  p. 259, in real life situations this gives a definite 
advantage over methods where in principle all agents have incentives to misrepresent 
their valuations.
Addendum. The unique  equitable variant of the Steinhaus-Knaster procedure – named 
“Adjusted Knaster” by Raith (2000) (see also Chisholm, cit., Corradi and Corradi 2002, 
Sanchez 2002) – presents the same vulnerability to cheating as the original procedure. 
Indeed, the winning bidder pays  1)/111(1 bmbqp −=   for the item assigned and each 
agent  j  , j > 1, receives the compensatory amount  1)/( bmjbjqjp =  : it is readily seen 
that  pj  is a strictly increasing function of  bj ,  pk  is a strictly decreasing function of 
bj  , k ≠ j , so that the main points raised by Fragnelli and Marina still hold. In particular, 
each agent maintains a double incentive to bid insincerely, to increase his payoff and to 
protect himself from losing money as a consequence of other agents’ strategic bidding.
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